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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
SAMMY LEE WHITE, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JOHN W. TURNER and HERBERT 
MIDDLETON, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 
13627 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a decision of the Third Judi-
cial District Court denying appellants' motion to dismiss. 
Said motion was argued and denied February 21, 1974. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellants' motion to dismiss was denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Apellants seek a reversal of the lower court judgment 
which denied appellants' motion. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Respondent filed an amended civil complaint on Oc 
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tober 5, 1973, which alleged that he sustained the loss of 
his arm because of the negligence of appellants. In re-
sponse to appellants' motion for a more definite state-
ment, respondent submitted a "statement" dated De-
cember 20, 1973, which somewhat clarified the allegations 
made in his amended complaint. Nowhere in the allega-
tions contained in respondent's amended complaint or his 
subsequent statement was it alleged, however, that de-
fendants were guilty of anything but ordinary negligent 
acts committed within the scope of their employment as 
officers of the State. 
Appellants made motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim upon whdch relief may be granted, which 
motion was denied. 
At the same time appellants made motion for joinder 
of a necessary party, the denial of which motion appel-
lants do not choose to appeal, believing that the issue of 
appellants' inclusion under the mantle of sovereign im-
munity can be adequately presented by argument directed 
to appellants' motion to dismiss. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISS-
ING APPELLANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS 
SINCE THE RULE IN UTAH AND THE MA-
JORITY RULE REQUIRES AN ALLEGA-
TION OF GROSS NEGLIGENCE OR MALI-
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CIOUS CONDUCT ON THE PART OF 
STATE OFFICERS IN ORDER TO MAIN-
TAIN A CIVIL ACTION AGAINST SAID IN-
DIVIDUALS. 
In both the complaint and amended complaint filed 
by respondent in this action the alleged negligent acts of 
appellants were performed within the scope of their em-
ployment as Warden of the Utah State Prison and Direc-
tor of the Prison Laundry. Furthermore, no allegations 
that the conduct of appellants was other than negligent 
have been made. These circumstances therefore require 
the dismissal of the action for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted since the common law and 
statutory doctrine of governmental immunity disallows 
civil suit in this particular fact situation. 
As asserted in the lower court, appellants maintain 
that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, in conjunc-
tion with the common doctrine of sovereign immunity, 
precludes the maintenance of an action in this case. This 
same view was expressed by this court in the case of 
Sheffield v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 314, 445 P. 2d 367 (1968). 
In that case a prison inmate brought an action against 
both the state and the warden of the state prison for 
damages resulting from a stabbing he sustained during 
his incerceration. The inmate charged that the warden 
had been negligent. 
Justice Crockett in articulating the unanimous de-
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cision of the court, upheld the lower court's dismissal of 
the action stating: 
;,'••;",'". . . the warden and other prison officers are 
protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
against claims of negligence so long as they are 
acting in good faith and within the scope of their 
duties, and that they could not be held liable un-
less they were guilty of some conduct which 
transcended the bounds of good faith perform-
ance of their duty by a wilful or malicious wrong-
ful act which they know or should know would 
result in injury. 
"The plaintiff's amended complaint, charging the 
Warden with negligence as indicated in the fore 
part of this opinion, fails to meet the test above 
set forth. The order dismissing the complaint is 
affirmed." Ibid, at 317. (Emphasis added.) 
In other words in order for the warden or other officers of 
the prison to be liable for acts performed in the scope 
of their employment the conduct must be that " . . . which 
transcended the bonds of good faith performance of their 
duties by a willful or malicious wrongful act which they 
know or should have known would result in injury." Id. 
at 317. 
The complaint of respondent does not allege the 
willful or malicious acts required in order to maintain a 
cause of action against the warden or other officers of 
the prison and the same should therefore be dismissed. 
Any question as to the application of the Sheffield 
holding to situations other than those involving inmate 
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attacks was removed by the case of Anderson Investment 
Corporation v. State, 28 Utah 2d 379, 503 P. 2d 144 
(1972). The case involved an action against the State 
Road Commission and road commission employees. This 
court said: 
"In the instant suit Anderson did make the 
individual members of the commission parties de-
fendant. However, they are not bound by the 
dicta in the State v. Fourth Judicial District 
Court case. These members in the performance 
of their duties have the same immunity as does 
the commission which they constitute.'9 Id. at 
381. (Emphasis added.) 
This court then cited as authority its holding in 
Sheffield v. Turner, supra. 
"In the case of Sheffield v. Turner, this court 
held: 
The anciently established and almost uni-
versally recognized general rule which this court 
has consistently announced and adhered to is 
that the government, its agencies and officials 
performing governmental functions are protected 
by sovereign immunity . . ." Anderson Invest-
ment Corp. v. State, at 382. (Emphasis added.) 
The reason for application of sovereign immunity in 
these cases is obvious. The immunity of the governmen-
tal body should be extended to officers of a governmental 
unit, so long as such officers are engaged in the exercise 
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and discharge of a governmental function and so long as 
they do not exceed the scope of the power of their par-
ticular officer. Such a position is predicated on the fact 
that the only authority under which a government 
official may act is that of the governmental unit. Thus, 
so long as the official is engaged in the exercise and dis-
charge of a governmental function, and provided that his 
conduct does not exceed the scope of his office or amount 
to gross negligence or maliciousness, he should be entitled 
to the same immunity from suit as the governmental 
entity he is employed by. 
This reasoning is especially applicable to officers of 
the Utah State Prison in light of problems inherent in 
the supervision of the prison and those incarcerated 
therein. In this situation we are dealing with convicted 
felons who resent the supervision imposed upon them 
by the State and will jump at every opportunity to harass 
those charged with their supervision. To allow prisoners 
to sue guards and officials of the prison in their private 
capacities, for acts occurring within the scope of their 
employment would paralyze the functioning of the penal 
system and force wardens and guards to cater to the 
whims and caprice of inmates or submit to numerous civil 
suits. 
It may be further pointed out that a problem pres-
ently exists to secure competent individuals to function 
and supervise the penal system. To allow this type of 
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suit would not only compound the problem of finding 
competent individuals but would make difficult the re-
tention of the qualified personnel presently functioning 
in the Utah State Penal System. 
For other authorities expressing this same view see 
Ban v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564, 70 S. Ct. 1335, 3 L. Ed. 2d 
1434 (1959); Gregoire v. Biddle, 111 F. 2d 579 (2d Cir. 
1949); Lang v. Wood, 92 F. 2d 211 (D. C. Cir. 1937); 
Norton v. McShane, 332 F. 2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964); Buck 
v. Babb, 23 111. App. 2d 285, 162 N. E. 2d 594 (1959); St. 
Louis, ex ret. Forest v. Nicholas, 374 S. W. 2d 547 (Mo. 
App. 1964); Travis v. Pinto, 87 N. J. Super. 263, 208 A. 
2d 828 (1965). 
The duties imposed upon the warden specifically and 
on other prison officials involve the use of considerable 
latitude and discussion in order to insure the successful 
performance of their duties. See Utah Code Ann. §§64-
19-13 and 64-9-38 (1953). In making these decisions offi-
cials are expected to make decisions involving much dis-
cretion. Surely these officials should not be penalized for 
exercising the discretion required to efficiently function 
for the public. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully submits that since there 
was no malice involved in the alleged actions of defen-
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dants Turner and Middleton, it was improper for the 
lower court to refuse to grant the appellants' motion to 
dismiss. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
M. REID RUSSELL 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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